
Protecting Our Crowded Places from Attack: New Zealand's Strategy

Te Whakamaru i Ō Tātau Wāhi Kōpiripiri mai i te Whakaekenga: Te Rautaki a Aotearoa

Kia Kahu Pitongatonga Te Matatini

To shelter the multitude with this cloak, an impenetrable garment

This strategy has been contributed to by multiple agencies, representing many sectors that have specialist expertise in this area. There is a collective agreement on the content and approach outlined in Protecting Our Crowded Places from Attack: New Zealand's Strategy and associated documentation.

Contributing agencies are:

- Combined Threat Assessment Group
- Department of Internal Affairs
- Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
- Ministry of Transport
- New Zealand Police
- New Zealand Security Intelligence Service
- Waka Kotahi New Zealand Transport Agency
- Protective Security Requirements

This strategy draws on Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism

Te Whare Tapa Whā

The house of four walls is the model of wellbeing developed by Sir Mason Durie. The walls represent the key components of wellness. The health of the land and environment around us is strongly connected to our health and wellbeing. Events we cannot control may impact on our whare, however we can all take actions to strengthen Te Whare Tapa Whā. Our connection with the whenua is our foundation, the place where we stand, a place of belonging and includes the spaces where we feel comfortable, safe and free to be ourselves.




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Introduction

New Zealanders value the ability to congregate, socialise and connect alongside others. This can involve working in, using or visiting crowded places.

The nature of crowded places means they pose extra risks to people, as they can be a target for attacks. Everyone has a role to play in keeping crowded places safe, whether they are government officials, owners and operators of crowded places, community organisers or members of the public.

The New Zealand Government has developed this strategy to help owners and operators of crowded places protect the lives of people working in, using and visiting their crowded place.

The strategy intends to preserve the public's use and enjoyment of crowded places, while ensuring that their safety has been considered. It enables a consistent approach to protecting crowded places throughout New Zealand and uses methods that are in proportion to the threat.

Making crowded places safe from attack is consistent with Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi), which reflects the relationship between Māori – tangata whenua – and the Crown, and ensures a principle of working in partnership. The document explains what crowded places are and what risks they pose. It outlines the responsibilities of, central and local government, owners and operators of crowded places, public security providers and the public in relation to keeping crowded places safe.

New Zealand's strategy to protect crowded places from attack rests on four elements:

- building stronger partnerships
- better sharing of information and guidance
- implementing effective protective security and
- increasing resilience.

This document explains how these four interconnected elements will be implemented.

New Zealand is a member of the Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) and works closely with Australia to coordinate and maintain effective counter-terrorism arrangements.

The Crowded Places Advisory Group New Zealand (CPAGNZ) and the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Committee (CTCC) will regularly review this strategy to ensure it stays relevant to threats to New Zealand's crowded places and remains consistent with ANZCTC's guidance.

When you read this strategy, refer to the Glossary and Abbreviations for any terms that you're unfamiliar with.

Crowded places

Crowded places are locations that large numbers of people access easily and predictably. They include sporting arenas; transport hubs and public transport; buildings and offices; schools, shopping centres; restaurants, hotels, theatres and other entertainment venues; community festivals and markets; houses of worship; tourist attractions; and civic spaces. Crowded places also include open spaces like busy urban streets, parks and pedestrian malls.

A crowded place is not necessarily always crowded: the density of the crowd may vary between day and night, and between seasons; the crowd may be temporary (such as during sporting events, festivals, concerts or one-off events).



Risks to crowded places

Crowded places have been a target for attackers. We have seen this from the attacks in New Zealand at the Al Noor and Linwood Mosques, Christchurch (March 2019); Manchester Arena, United Kingdom (May 2017); Finsbury Park, London Bridge and Borough Market, United Kingdom (June 2017); Bastille Day parade, Nice, France (July 2016); Berlin Christmas market, Germany (December 2016) where attacks caused significant loss of life. These attacks have been glorified in propaganda. Some people view these attacks as worthy of emulation and call for potential attackers to target members of the public in crowded places.

In most cases, the large volume and concentration of people at a crowded place is what makes it an attractive target, rather than the location itself. Attackers may focus on crowded places for several reasons:

- Large crowds—especially when they are highly concentrated—offer the potential to cause mass casualties.
- Indiscriminate attacks at crowded places can strongly affect people psychologically, especially if they regularly visit similar types of crowded places.
- Crowded places are often open and easy to access, which can make planning the attack easier.
- Crowded places can have symbolic value for a country, government or culture.
- Attacks at crowded places are likely to disrupt surrounding businesses and infrastructure (such as transport networks), which increases their chances of causing significant long-term economic damage.
- Large crowds offer more witnesses, which can increase an attack's impact. Social media can quickly spread first-hand accounts, images and footage of an attack.
- Attacks at crowded places will attract widespread and often global media coverage.

There are multiple factors that ultimately determine the location that an attacker chooses. These include where they live, any specific grievances they have, and the types of weapons and equipment they can access. The weapons and tactics that attackers use are influenced by what is available to them; their skills, knowledge, opportunities and motivations; the makeup of their group; and their strategic, ideological and tactical objectives. The interplay of these factors influences the size, style, sophistication and location of an attack, and its likelihood of success.

People who are preparing for, or undertaking, an attack may display certain behaviours. These can be specific behaviours related to planning the attack (such as reconnaissance) or general behaviours that indicate their intentions to attack, or their support for terrorist activity (such as repeatedly expressing extreme ideologically based violent-extremist sentiments).

Internationally, several attacks have been detected by bystanders who acted on their initial suspicion and observation that something about an individual's activity was 'not quite right' and reported it to authorities. Owners and operators of crowded places are often best placed to detect suspicious behaviour; making New Zealand Police, or someone in a position of authority e.g. a security guard at an event, aware of possible suspicious behaviour is an important role they can play.

Part of owners and operators of crowded places' emergency planning involves considering risks from hazards and threats such as fire, earthquake or tsunami. Their emergency and security plans need to cover responses to these hazards and threats, along with the response to an attack.

Our message to people at crowded places

This section explains the message that New Zealand Police wants everyone to know, understand and remember in case they are involved in an attack at a crowded place.

If you're at a crowded place that's attacked remember: **ESCAPE. HIDE. TELL.**

All situations are different. You will need to make quick decisions during an attack and be prepared to change your plan. Remembering **ESCAPE. HIDE. TELL.** will help you decide what to do.

ESCAPE		Move quickly and quietly away from danger, but only if it is safe to do so.
HIDE		Stay out of sight and silence your mobile phone.
TELL		Call the Police by dialling 111 when it is safe.

Responsibility

All New Zealanders have a responsibility to help detect and prevent attacks in crowded places. Everyone who works in, or uses, a crowded place should be aware of their surroundings and report suspicious or unusual behaviour to authorities.

In an emergency everyone should phone 111

If the information is not time-critical, people can report suspicious or unusual behaviour by:

- completing a report at [105.police.govt.nz](https://www.police.govt.nz/contact-us/stations), or calling Police's non-emergency number **105**
- visiting their nearest [Police station](#)¹
- phoning Crimestoppers on **0800 555 111**
- contacting the NZSIS on **0800 747 224** or via their [Public Contribution Form](https://providinginformation.nzsis.govt.nz)².

¹www.police.govt.nz/contact-us/stations

²<https://providinginformation.nzsis.govt.nz>

New Zealand's strategy for protecting crowded places

The Government has prepared this strategy, and a series of guidelines and tools (see the [New Zealand Police Crowded Places website](#))³, to help owners and operators better protect their crowded places from potential attacks.

Even the most robust protective security plan may not be enough to stop an attack on a crowded place occurring or causing harm. However, well-considered and well-tested protective security measures can reduce the likelihood of an attack occurring and lessen its consequences.

New Zealand's strategy has four elements that can be applied consistently, yet flexibly, to all crowded places (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: New Zealand's strategy for protecting crowded places



Building stronger partnerships

This strategy will use existing partnerships between New Zealand organisations to make the organisations more aware of risks at crowded places and increase their resilience to attacks.

To protect crowded places in an evolving-threat environment, the Government, New Zealand Police and its partners (local governments, owners and operators of crowded places, and communities) need to work together in sharing information with each other. Their ability to do this effectively relies on them having strong partnerships.

New Zealand Police will establish three groups:

- Crowded Places Advisory Group New Zealand (CPAGNZ)
- Business Advisory Group New Zealand (BAGNZ)
- Community Advisory Group New Zealand (CAGNZ)

These groups will contribute insights and ideas gathered from the sector they represent, related to making New Zealand's crowded places more resilient. It is expected that these groups will share appropriate information received back to the sector they represent. This information may be shared directly or by directing people to new information on the [New Zealand Police Crowded Places website](#)⁴.

Crowded Places Advisory Group New Zealand (CPAGNZ)

The CPAGNZ's members are representatives of government agencies that are responsible for protecting New Zealand's crowded places. The CPAGNZ reports to the CTCC.

Business Advisory Group New Zealand (BAGNZ)

The BAGNZ's members represent New Zealand business groups. The BAGNZ provides advice and guidance to the CPAGNZ.

Community Advisory Group New Zealand (CAGNZ)

The CAGNZ's members represent New Zealand community groups. The CAGNZ provides advice and guidance to the CPAGNZ.

Local Engagement

CPAGNZ, BAGNZ and CAGNZ will look to establish ways to communicate out to owners and operators of crowded places through existing forums run in local areas in order to share information, lessons learned from others and feedback processes and good practice.

Better sharing of information and guidance

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) is responsible for leading, coordinating and supporting New Zealand's national security system.

Information on New Zealand's threat environment, how we respond to an incident and the terrorism threat level can be found on the [DPMC website](#)⁵.

The inter-agency Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) produces terrorism threat assessments that it shares with New Zealand Police and other agencies that protect New Zealanders from terrorism. New Zealand Police translates this intelligence into information and guidance that is relevant locally and shares it appropriately.

New Zealand Police is publishing a series of guidelines and tools for owners and operators of crowded places. When information changes, it will update these guidelines and tools and add new ones to the series. Owners and operators of crowded places are responsible for checking they have the latest information from the series. These guidelines and tools will be available to the public on the [New Zealand Police website](#)⁵.

Implementing effective protective security

Protective security measures aim to deter, detect, delay, respond to and recover from an attack.

Owners and operators of crowded places are responsible for:

- assessing the risks and vulnerabilities of their crowded place
- implementing appropriate mitigations for risks at their crowded place
- keeping mitigations in proportion with the risks to their crowded place
- monitoring the effectiveness of the mitigations
- reviewing the mitigations at appropriate times.

This section of the strategy gives owners and operators of crowded places basic knowledge about protective security.

Assess the risks and vulnerabilities of a crowded place

Before deciding which protective security measures to use, owners and operators must determine how exposed their location is to attack and assess its risks and vulnerabilities in a proportionate way. They may need to consult private security providers to help them. Read more about conducting a security assessment on the [New Zealand Crowded Places Police website](#)⁶.

⁵ www.dPMC.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security-and-intelligence/national-security/counter-terrorism

⁶ www.police.govt.nz/crowdedplaces

Implement appropriate mitigations for risks to a crowded place

To make a crowded place less vulnerable to attacks, owners and operators need to consider how to deter, detect, delay and respond to an attack. These four aspects of protective security are known as layers.

Layered security (sometimes referred to as 'hardening' or 'security in depth') is an effective way of making crowded places less vulnerable to attacks. Layered security means securing a site with multiple complementary protective security measures within the four layers to **deter, detect, delay and respond** to an attack (see Figure 2). If it is implemented correctly, layered security ensures that if one layer fails it will not significantly compromise the overall security of the crowded place.

The actual mitigations that owners and operators of crowded places can use, to deter, detect, delay and respond to an attack, will differ from location to location. To help decide which mitigations are appropriate, they should consider the:

- purpose of the crowded place and whether it's used by high-profile individuals
- history of security incidents at the crowded place
- presence of high-risk facilities near the crowded place
- existing security measures
- prevailing threat advice
- mitigations needed to create a clear line of sight/observation.

Refer to Figure 3 for examples of protective security measures in each layer that owners and operators of crowded places can use. Some security measures strengthen more than one layer. For example, security officers can help to deter, detect, delay and respond to an attack.

Figure 2: Layered Security



Figure 3: Examples of protective security measures



Keeping mitigations in proportion with the risks

Protective security measures can be costly. If they are not correctly managed, they can alienate staff and the public, and disrupt the day-to-day operations of a crowded place. To avoid these problems, owners and operators of crowded places may want to get specialist advice on which mitigations are appropriate for their place.

Owners and operators of crowded places should be guided by these principles:

- It is not possible to protect everything; prioritise the highest risk areas of the crowded place
- It is important that protective security measures are proportionate to the level and type of threat to the crowded place
- It is more cost-effective to plan security for a crowded place when it is being designed than when it is already in place.

Monitor the effectiveness of mitigations

In the absence of an attack, it is difficult to measure how resilient a crowded place is—you cannot evaluate what has not happened. However, by regularly testing and evaluating policies and procedures, learning from previous events, practicing security arrangements and responses, and continually training staff, owners and operators of crowded places can help ensure that the mitigations they have in place are current and fit for purpose.

Review the mitigations at appropriate times

It is natural that owners and operators of crowded places will examine attacks that happen elsewhere and seek to understand what it means for them. However, if they have thoroughly assessed risks and applied layered security, they can be confident that the resilience of their crowded place could reduce the impact of an attack.

The Protective Security Requirements (PSR) is a best practice policy framework to assist New Zealand organisations to develop security arrangements that are suitable for their organisation. Refer to the [PSR website](https://www.protectivesecurity.govt.nz/about-the-psr/overview/framework)⁷ for more information.

Increasing resilience

Even the most robust protective security plan may not be enough to stop an attack on a crowded place occurring or succeeding. However, well-considered and well-tested protective security will reduce the likelihood of an attack occurring and may lessen its consequences.

A resilient crowded place has trusted relationships with government agencies, other crowded places and the public. It has access to accurate and contemporary threat information, and has a way to translate this threat information into effective, proportionate protective security measures.

Having a resilient crowded place can help prevent it being attacked, reduce the damage caused by an attack and enable its owner and operator to resume business-as-usual activities quicker. Building a strong security culture is central to increasing a crowded place's resilience to attacks and other types of criminal activity.

Building an effective security culture can include:

- making security a permanent feature of executive decision-making and agendas
- requiring senior managers to demonstrate personal commitment to, and compliance with, security values and standards
- understanding the commercial, reputational and legal risks that could result from protective security measures that are inadequate to prevent or mitigate an attack
- giving staff clear, succinct and jargon-free guidance about security standards and procedures
- promoting good security practice to staff and visitors through internal-communication systems, posters, message boards and newsletters

⁷ www.protectivesecurity.govt.nz/about-the-psr/overview/framework

- adopting effective and lawful staff-screening processes during recruitment, and ensuring contractors and vendors have adopted similar processes
- training staff in security practices
- putting all staff through security scenario exercises
- penetrating security and initiating security breaches to test protective security measures
- sharing information about security breaches with staff
- encouraging and rewarding staff who identify and report security vulnerabilities and incidents.

Communication runs through the length and breadth of every organisation; communication about security should be no different. Protecting a crowded place relies on building and sustaining a culture of trust and security among managers and frontline staff. People who are responsible for managing the security of a crowded place should regularly meet with staff to discuss security and encourage staff to raise their concerns about security. Security managers should also consider using a communication strategy that will make staff more aware of security plans and how to use them.

Recovery

In the unfortunate event that an attack occurs, recovering from an attack involves rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating affected individuals, communities and physical assets. It usually begins once an incident has been resolved and continues until the disruption has ended, demands on services have returned to normal and people affected have had their needs met. The Government will work with affected owners and operators of crowded places to re-establish essential services and restore public confidence as quickly as possible.

Owners and operators of crowded places should have a business-continuity plan (BCP) that they can activate during the response phase of any major disruption, including an attack. A BCP is central to the recovery process; it is designed to help a business, activity or location return to normal as quickly as possible after an attack.

When they make a BCP, owners and operators must decide which assets, systems and activities are most important, and within what timeframes certain operations must be resumed.

A robust BCP will often include:

- cross-training staff and volunteers in different skills
- documented procedures to allow staff to quickly perform unfamiliar tasks
- agreed sites to relocate operations
- remote access to IT systems in nominated backup locations
- alternative sources of essential equipment
- secure offsite storage of data backups and valuable documents
- agreed methods for contacting staff, clients and other critical personnel out-of-hours.

In the event of an attack, the arrangements outlined in a BCP may be overridden by police or a coroner. A coroner may control a location for a significant period to secure a site and carry out forensic examinations. This would prevent normal business operations resuming. The police and coroner will attempt to minimise the duration of this period.

Responsibilities for keeping crowded places safe

The Government, New Zealand Police, local government, owners and operators of crowded places, private security and the public share responsibility for making crowded places resilient to terrorist attacks, or similar incidents.

Government agencies, including New Zealand Police have a network of international relationships to exchange expertise on protecting crowded places. These relationships allow New Zealand to identify, refine and share the most effective measures to protect its crowded places.

This section of the strategy outlines the different responsibilities that organisations and individuals have, to keep crowded places safe from attack.

Government

The Government has the primary responsibility for preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks or similar incidents in New Zealand.

The DPMC is responsible for leading, coordinating and supporting New Zealand's national security system. This includes coordinating the delivery of New Zealand's Counter-Terrorism Strategy⁸ (through the cross-government CTCC), and activating coordination mechanisms if a terror attack or similar incident occurs.

The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) is responsible for detecting, investigating and understanding terrorism threats, and hosts the inter-agency Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG)⁹ that sets New Zealand's national terrorism-threat level.

CTAG does this by assessing the likelihood of a terrorism incident against a five level scale (see figure 4).

Figure 4: CTAG Threat Level Definitions

Threat Level	Likelihood Assessment
Extreme	Terrorist attack is expected.
High	Terrorist attack is assessed as highly likely.
Medium	Terrorist attack is assessed as feasible and could well occur.
Low	Terrorist attack is assessed as a realistic possibility.
Very low	Terrorist attack is assessed as unlikely.

⁸ www.dPMC.govt.nz/publications/new-zealands-counter-terrorism-strategy

⁹ www.nzsis.govt.nz/our-work/counter-terrorism/combined-threat-assessment-group-ctag

A change in threat level is used to determine government planning and risk management, and to advise agencies so they can take any further appropriate measures. A change in the threat level does not necessarily require specific response from the public.

New Zealand's terrorism threat level and information about counter-terrorism and wider national security is available on the [DPMC's website](#)¹⁰.

The New Zealand Government uses the national terrorism threat level to inform and guide how it assesses and manages terrorism risks. Threat and risk assessments form the basis of the New Zealand's Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which is overseen by the Security and Intelligence Board (SIB) and the CTCC.

If a terrorism incident occurs, the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) provides all-of-government coordination of the response and makes recommendations to Ministers including the Prime Minister.

New Zealand Police

Police have responsibilities in both terrorism and protective security.

Police leads New Zealand's response to any domestic terrorism threat, attack or similar incident. Police and intelligence agencies work with the public and the private sector to protect crowded places, and they are well-equipped to detect and disrupt terrorist plots.

Police leads the Crowded Places Advisory Group New Zealand, which works with other government and non-government agencies to facilitate crowded places advisory groups.

New Zealand Police may also advise owners and operators to engage their own security specialist for guidance.

Local government

Local government has an important role in the safety and wellbeing of New Zealand communities. This includes helping to protect crowded places from terrorist attack or similar incident.

Local government are often responsible for managing civic spaces, public activities, celebrations, agricultural shows and community markets, events and festivals. This means they have the same duty of care—to develop, implement and regularly test protective security measures—that owners and operators of crowded places have.

Local government also have an important role in designing and approving public spaces. This gives them the opportunity to consider, and creatively apply, protective security measures during the early design stages of crowded places, which can minimise the disruption of protective security on people's enjoyment of public spaces.

Owners and operators of crowded places

Owners and operators of crowded places include businesses, event organisers, sports clubs, charities, community groups, religious groups, government agencies and local government.

Owners and operators are responsible for assessing the risks and vulnerabilities of their crowded places. Understanding the main factors that influence where terrorists target attacks will help owners and operators assess and manage risks.

New Zealand Police has published a series of guidelines and tools on this subject (the [New Zealand Police Crowded Places website](#)¹¹). All of these tools are designed to help owners and operators of crowded places understand how exposed their locations may be.

¹⁰ www.dPMC.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security-and-intelligence/national-security/counter-terrorism

¹¹ www.police.govt.nz/crowdedplaces

The tools available include self-assessment and protective security assessments. These tools will guide users through a range of questions to provide guidance on next steps required in order to improve the security of their crowded place.

Based on the results of the self-assessment, the tool gives guidance about what steps to take next. These may include talking to police, undertaking a risk assessment of the location, hiring a private security contractor and implementing effective and proportionate protective security measures recommended by an expert. Owners and operators of crowded places are responsible for implementing appropriate mitigations, monitoring the effectiveness of the mitigations and reviewing the mitigations regularly.

Developing, implementing, and regularly testing a comprehensive security plan is a corporate responsibility and makes good business sense. The reputation of an owner and operator of a crowded place could be badly and permanently damaged if they do not prioritise protecting people from potential attacks. Any damage to their reputation could significantly affect their business finances. Being security minded and better prepared could not only deter an attack, but also reassure customers and staff that a business is taking its security responsibilities seriously.

The priority of a security plan is saving lives and minimising harm to people. The plan should also aim to protect the continuity of business by safeguarding physical assets, information, reputation and other relevant elements. The approaches to reducing risks from hazards, natural disasters and man-made events, are like those for protecting crowded places. Owners and operators of crowded places should, therefore, make use of existing plans and methods for safeguarding their locations.

Owners and operators of crowded places are responsible for understanding what the current terrorist-threat environment means for the security of their site. This includes knowing

what changes they would need to make to their security arrangements and plans if the national threat level¹² was raised or lowered, and knowing how long it would take them to make these changes. They are also responsible for making their staff and patrons aware of possible security threats.

Owners and operators of crowded places must report to the police any security incidents or suspicious activity at the earliest possible opportunity.

Private security providers

Private security providers have an important role to protect crowded places. Sometimes private security personnel (security contractors, risk-analysis experts and private security officers) are directly responsible for making crowded places more secure.

Often they are the first responders to a terrorist attack or similar incident. Consequently, they must be well trained and professional.

The public

All New Zealanders have a responsibility to help detect and prevent attacks in crowded places. Everyone who works in, or uses, a crowded place should be aware of their surroundings and report suspicious or unusual behaviour to authorities.

In an emergency everyone should phone 111

If the information is not time-critical, people can report suspicious or unusual behaviour by:

- completing a report at [105.police.govt.nz](https://www.police.govt.nz), or calling Police's non-emergency number **105**
- visiting their nearest Police station¹³
- phoning Crimestoppers on **0800 555 111**
- contacting the NZSIS on **0800 747 224** or via their Public Contribution Form¹⁴.

¹² www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security-and-intelligence/national-security/counter-terrorism

¹³ www.police.govt.nz/contact-us/stations

¹⁴ <https://providinginformation.nzsis.govt.nz>

***All New Zealanders
are responsible for
helping to detect
and prevent attacks
in crowded places.***

Glossary

Australia– New Zealand Counter- Terrorism Committee	Committee responsible for effective coordination and cooperation on counter-terrorism matters across New Zealand and Australia.
Business Advisory Group New Zealand	Group of representatives from New Zealand's business groups that advises the Crowded Places Advisory Group New Zealand.
Business continuity plan	Documented procedures that are designed to help a business, activity or location return to normal as quickly as possible after being impacted by a major incidence or occurrence.
Combined Threat Assessment Group	An inter-agency group that provides assessment to inform decision-makers of the physical threat posed by terrorism to New Zealanders and New Zealand interests.
Community Advisory Group New Zealand	Group of representatives from New Zealand's community groups that advises the Crowded Places Advisory Group New Zealand.
Crowded places	Crowded places are locations that large numbers of people access easily and predictably. They include sporting arenas; transport hubs and public transport; buildings and offices; shopping centres; restaurants, hotels, theatres and entertainment venues; community markets, houses of worship; tourist attractions; and civic spaces. Crowded places also include open spaces like busy urban streets, parks and pedestrian malls.
Crowded Places Advisory Group New Zealand	Group of representatives of government agencies, which are responsible for New Zealand's national security that advises the CTCC.
ESCAPE. HIDE. TELL	The recommended approach that people should take if they are involved in an attack at a crowded place.
Layered security	Securing a site by using complementary protective security measures within four layers: deter, detect, delay and respond to an attack (also referred to as 'security in depth' or 'hardening').
Mitigation	A measure that is used before, during or after an attack to decrease or eliminate the likelihood of an attack or its impact on people, property or a location.
Protective security measures	Measures used to deter, detect, delay and respond to an attack. These measures include obvious physical and electronic measures (such as fences or electronic access control gates), visual detection and alert systems (such as CCTV cameras), security personnel and security processes, etc.

Abbreviations

ANZCTC Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee

BAGNZ Business Advisory Group New Zealand

BCP Business Continuity Plan

CAGNZ Community Advisory Group New Zealand

CPAGNZ Crowded Places Advisory Group New Zealand

CTAG Combined Threat Assessment Group

CTCC Counter-Terrorism Coordination Committee

DPMC Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

NZSIS New Zealand Security Intelligence Service

ODESC Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination

SIB Security and Intelligence Board

PSR Protective Security Requirements

In the event of an attack

ESCAPE		Move quickly and quietly away from danger, but only if it is safe to do so.
HIDE		Stay out of sight and silence your mobile phone.
TELL		Call the Police by dialling 111 when it is safe.

www.police.govt.nz/crowdedplaces